Is there a connection between state-law tort reform and the explosive growth of U.S. intellectual property (IP) Using data gathered from various sources, including Lex Machina and the Database of State Tort Law Reforms, we find more systematic evidence of a related proposition-namely, that state tort reform significantly and substantially increases copyright and patent filings in U.S.
I. Introduction
Reforms of medical malpractice law have held a central place on many state legislative agendas. Dozens of different reforms have been enacted, struck down, or reenacted in the recent decades (Avraham 2010 ). Even at the national level, tort reform has made an appearance. Indeed, no fewer than 16 bills to federalize the various aspects of medical malpractice law (currently governed by state common law) have been debated in the U.S. Congress over the last decade. The Republicans made tort reform a major component of the 2010 midterm elections. Indeed the U.S House Judiciary Committee approved recently a reform bill seeking to cap damages in medical malpractice suits.
The various impacts of tort reform have been widely explored. Previous scholarship has indicated that tort reform, especially caps on noneconomic damages or on overall payments, decreases payouts. 3 One of the most established findings, and one which makes total sense, is that tort reform reduces the number of medical malpractice claims (Paik, Black, Hyman, Sage & Silver 2010; Avraham 2007) . Because tort reform reduces plaintiffs' recoveries and/or the probability of recovering, and because plaintiff lawyers work on a contingency fee basis, tort reform likely makes it harder for many plaintiffs to find a lawyer who will take their case. 4 Indeed, this effective restriction of access to legal services, as well as the associated displacement of attorneys to other work, is presumably an intended result of much tort reform. Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin have described the logic of an apparently typical pro-reform argument as follows: "If medical malpractice cases become less profitable, then plaintiffs' lawyers (presumed to be rational, self-interested actors) will be less interested in handling such cases and move on to other, more profitable markets." 5 The result can be "real change in the civil justice system as lawyers move to new practice areas and away from older ones." 6 When state tort reform discourages plaintiffs' lawyers from taking on personal injury cases or other cases affected by the reform, what do they do? There is some evidence that some of them go to states without tort reform and that many of them retool in order to switch specialty (Carter 2006; Daniels & Martin 2002; Daniels & Martin 2006) . There is some anecdotal evidence that one of the areas which personal injury ("PI") lawyers gravitate towards is intellectual property ("IP") (Carter 2006) . 7 Such gravitation might reflect rational economic behavior as tort lawyers (or otherwise tort-lawyers-to-be) look for a next-best specialty area that offers viable work opportunities with the prospect of a relatively high rate of remuneration. 8 Of course, whether an area like IP offers viable work access to legal services for "women, children, and the elderly"); id. at 651-61 (discussing plaintiffs' lawyers' screening of cases to ensure economic viability); see also opportunities will depend on whether the work opportunities available are suitable for tort attorneys' skill sets or, at least, the skill sets of talent that they can purchase while maintaining the economic desirability of the enterprise. 9 We suggest below that at least high-end plaintiffs' attorneys, accustomed to complex litigation and the need to work with hired experts, will often find the leap to IP substantially less than insurmountable.
We explore the impact of tort reform on patent filings by exploiting two datasets: first, the Database of State Tort Law Reform ("DSTLR 4th"), a dataset that documents dozens of reforms in all 50 states and Washington, D.C., since the 1980s; and second, a new by eight other listed practice areas: (1) "Medical Malpractice (Plaintiff)," having average and median rates of $400 and $374, respectively; (2) "Condemnation Law," having average and median rates of $333 and $343, respectively; (3) "Auto Law (not including lemon law)," having average and median rates of $300 and $358, respectively; (4) "Personal Injury (Plaintiff)," having average and median rates of $300 and $327, respectively; (5) "Consumer Law (including lemon law)," having average and median rates of $300 and $301, respectively; (6) "Securities Law," having average and median rates of $290 and $287, respectively; (7) "Probate, Trust Litigation," having average and median rates of $288 and $298, respectively; and (8) "Tax Law," having average and median rates of $400 and $374, respectively. State Bar of Michigan, Economics of Law Practice in Michigan: 2010 Attorney Income and Billing Rate Key Findings Report, 90-FEB MICH. B.J. 14 (2011) . Tort reform might be understood to target at least plaintiffs' medical-malpractice, personal-injury, and consumer practice-items (1), (4), and (5) on this list. Probate, trust, and condemnation law-items (2) and (7)-would seem to provide relatively limited opportunities for litigation compared to other practice areas. Securities and tax law-items (6) and (8)-might have provided comparatively little opportunity for "migrating" tort lawyers, whether because their specialized bars already tended to meet any lucrative demand or because their specialized areas of practice, involving robust federal regulatory agencies, presented relatively high entry barriers for tort lawyers. This leaves item (3) on the list-"Auto Law"-or as perhaps the next most lucrative option, "Intellectual Property/Trade Secrets," an area of law that contrasts with securities and tax law in its lack of a comparatively robust federal agency, see John F. 11 We find that tort reform is associated with a substantial and statistically significant increase in copyright and patent filings but has no effect on trademark and trade secret filings. The impact on patent and copyright filings is statistically significant at the 1% level and robust to various ways of capturing tort reform. One potential explanation is that, to the extent tort reform produced an increase in trademark or trade secret filings, that increase was concentrated in state courts (which Lex Machina does not cover), rather than federal district courts which have exclusive jurisdiction over patents and copyright cases.
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Avraham (2006) (Carter 2006) . Indeed, as another personal injury Texas lawyer has explained: "You just have to replace practice areas the law takes away from you. We've added a business section doing contingency fee cases, including intellectual property." (Carter 2006 
III. Forming Hypotheses
Under 28 USC sec. 1338, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent and copyright claims. In contrast, trademark claims can be brought in both federal and state courts whereas trade secrets are primarily protected by state law. 18 If PI lawyers are best tooled for state courts, we might expect that, when they switch to IP, they will favor state courts whenever they can pursue IP claims in state courts and that they will favor federal courts otherwise. Thus, since our dataset is comprised of only federal courts filings we expect tort reform to have a substantially larger impact on patent and copyright filings than on trademark and trade secret filings. To the extent tort reform impacts trade secret and trademark filings we would expect to see that effect in state and not in federal courts.
personal injury lawyers, but broad tort reform shifted the town's legal focus 'from P.I. to I.P.-that is, they moved out of personal injury and into intellectual property.'"); Li Zhu, Note, Taking Off: Recent Changes to Venue Transfer of Patent Litigation in the Rocket Docket, 11 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 901, (2010) ("Local lawyers often joke that the passage of tort reform encouraged many in their profession to make the trip from P.I. to I.P.-that is, they moved out of personal injury and into the realm of intellectual property. Such humor, however, reflects much of the truth."). 17 Daniels & Martin, Texas Two-Step, supra note 3, at 657 (discussing how medical-malpractice lawyers form a specialized group within the plaintiffs' bar, in substantial part because "medical malpractice cases are very hard to prove and expensive to properly prepare"); see also id. at 668-69 (quoting "an East Texas lawyer" as characterizing "business litigation" as likely to be less difficult to litigate than a recent nursing-home case that involved 43 depositions). 18 About 46 states use a version of the Uniform Trade Secret Acts (available at http://stepstoatradesecret.com/Uniform%20Trade%20Secrets%20Act.pdf). 18 U.S.C Sec 1831-1839 is a criminal federal statute which makes it a felony to sell or otherwise deal in trade secret without owner's consent.
IV. Identification Strategy
We count the number of patent, copyright, trademark and trade secret filings using the . 20 The dataset is available for free download at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=902711.
coded state supreme court decisions striking down or upholding reforms. The DSTLR 4th edition is the most comprehensive and accurate dataset on tort reform legislation to date. Periodic Payment. Periodic payment reform allows or requires courts to award future damages that are above some threshold, usually $200,000, in periodic installments. This reform eases the burden on the defendant, who can purchase an annuity for that purpose, and potentially increases the burden on the plaintiff, who has to wait longer for complete payment. The reform can help the 21 Note that reforms are coded as of July 1 and refer to effective dates as opposed to enactment dates. 
b. Specifications
Our primary specification regresses the number of cases filed in a state on various measures of tort reforms, which vary at the state-year level. We use Poisson regressions although our results do not change qualitatively when we use negative binomial or ordinary least square regressions. We report standard errors clustered by state to allow for correlation in the error terms across districts within the same state. The baseline specification is as follows:
implementation of the reform in question. We present estimates including each of the three reforms described above singly as well as altogether. In addition, we report specifications using the sum of these three major reforms. This index allows us to test the average impact of introducing an additional liability limitation. Equation 1 includes state and year fixed effects. In addition, we estimate all models with state-specific time trends. Equation 1 also includes a time-varying state-specific measure: demographics. Our demographics vector includes population, number of lawyers and disposable income.
V. Results
We start by showing the effect of tort reform in Texas, which is the state from which we drew most of the anecdotal evidence described above. Table 1 and Table 2 show the regression results for patent and copyright filings across the entire U.S. Parallel results for trademark and trade-secret filings do not indicate any effect of tort reform on trademark and trade-secret filings. One potential explanation is that, to the extent tort reform produced an increase in trademark or trade-secret filings, that increase was concentrated in state courts, rather than federal district courts. Tables 1 and 2 Table 1 presents the results for our Poisson regression estimating the impact of tort reform on patent filings. Estimated coefficients transformed to incidence-rate ratios are reported, that is, exp(b) rather than b.
Column 3 in Table 1 shows that periodic payment reform is associated with the largest and most significant change in the number of patent filings. Specifically, enactment of tort reform is associated with the increasing of filings by a factor of 1.58 (p<.01). When state-specific time trends are accounted for, the factor decreases a bit to 1.38, yet still remains highly significant (see column 9). When other reforms are controlled for, the factor associated with periodic payment reform becomes 1.52 (p<.05) in the basic specification, and 1.34 (p<.05) with a state-specific time trend (columns 6 and 12, respectively).
Joint and several liability reform is associated with the increasing of patent filings by a factor of 1.18, yet this result is significant only at the 10% level, and is significant at only the 11% level when state-specific time trends are accounted for. The impact of joint and several liability disappears when we control for the other two reforms (see columns 6 and 12).
The coefficient on reform of caps on noneconomic damages suggests that this reform is associated with the increasing of patent filings by a factor of 1.34, but that this effect is significant only at the 11% level and disappears in the joint specifications.
We also estimated two types of "sum of reforms" variables. The sum of the three major reforms was found to increase patent filings by a factor of 1.14-1.21 (p<.01, see columns 4 and 10), depending on the specification. This means that, on average, adding one of the three major reforms increases filings by that factor. Our "sum of all 9 reforms" variable suggests that enactment of any one of the nine reforms enacted during the study period is associated with the increasing of patent filings by a factor between 1.10 (p<.01) to 1.12 (p<.05) depending on the specification (see columns 5 and 11). Table 2 presents the results for our Poisson regression estimating the impact of tort reform on copyright filings. As before, estimated coefficients transformed to incidence-rate ratios are reported-that is, exp(b) is reported rather than b. Table 2 suggests that the impact of tort reform on copyright filings is much more pronounced. Specifically, periodic payment reform is associated with the increasing of filings by a factor of 1.71 (p<.01, column 3). The factor increases to 1.86 and remains highly significant when state-specific time trends are accounted for (column 9). When other reforms are controlled for, the factor associated with periodic payment reform becomes 1.41 (p<.1, column 6) in the basic specification, and disappears when state-specific time trends are accounted for (column 12).
Joint and several liability reform is associated with the increasing of copyright filings by a factor of 2.41 (p<.01), and this factor increases to 4.11 (p<.01) when state-specific time trends are accounted for. The impact of joint and several liability reform remains similar when we control for the other two reforms (column 6).
As in Table 1 , caps on noneconomic damages had the smallest effect. Specifically, the observed coefficient suggests that this reform is associated with the increasing of copyright filings by a factor of 1.39 (p<.05), but this relationship disappears in the other specifications.
The sum of the three major reforms was found to be associated with the increasing of copyright filings by a factor of 1.41-1.64
(p<.01, columns 4 and 10, respectively), depending on the specification. This means, on average, adding one of the three major reforms increases copyright filings by that factor. Our "sum of all 9 reforms" variable suggests that enactment of any one of the nine reforms enacted during the study period is associated with the increasing of copyright filings by a factor of between 1.29 and 1.41 (p<.01), depending on the specification.
VI. Discussion
Our preliminary results suggest that tort reform has a large and significant positive impact on patent and copyright filings in U.S.
district courts in a state where reform occurs, but that such reform does not have similar impact on trademark and trade secret filings.
As discussed above, this might be explained by the fact that federal courts (which unlike state courts are covered by Lex Machina) have exclusive jurisdiction over patent and copyright claims. An alternative hypothesis is that PI attorneys moving into other areas of practice are truly more likely to gravitate toward patent and copyright litigation, rather than trademark or trade secret litigation, perhaps because patent and copyright litigation offers more opportunities for lucrative suits brought by non-incumbent industry players (e.g., independent inventors or startup firms) who might be most likely to seek the services of former PI attorneys. Further research, including study of IP case filings in state courts, might help suggest which of these hypotheses provides a better explanation.
In the meantime, the fact that the percentage change in copyright filings associated with state tort reform is even greater than the percentage change in patent filings is also a point of interest. To the extent this difference is robust, it could reflect relative ease in filing and financing copyright suits or, alternatively or simultaneously, the fact that patent litigation involves special skills and technical knowledge that are more difficult to pick up when transitioning from a different area of practice. practice" in patent law with the determination by the general counsel of Texas Instruments that he "could go to trial quickly" in patent cases filed in Marshall, Texas, "because it did not have a very big docket"). 25 Cf. Lemley, supra note 24, at 415 (noting the existence of "some notable-and well-known-'rocket dockets'" for patent litigation).
ways that are desirable to plaintiffs. Statements by judges from the Eastern District of Texas suggest that this judge-centered dynamic might be at least a partial explanation for post-tort-reform growth of patent filings in that district. 26 In short, even without the transitioning of significant numbers of PI lawyers to IP, there could be court-centered mechanisms by which state tort reform leads to increased IP filings. Detailed study of the nature of the lawyers filing IP cases in particular states could help shed light on the significance of such mechanisms as supplements or alternatives to the PI-to-IP mechanism. Such study is a potential avenue for future research.
Meanwhile, we are cautious about our ability to make inferences about the impact of any specific type of reform because in our study enactments of different types of reform often correlate with one another. For example, all three joint-and-several-liability reforms enacted during our study years (Nevada 2003 , Pennsylvania 2002 and South Carolina 2006 were enacted as part of packages with other reforms. Similarly, in our study, three of the five periodic payment reforms and four out of the ten caps-on-noneconomicdamages reforms were enacted as part of packages with other reforms.
Lastly, some of the results, such as the 4.11 coefficient on the joint and several liability reforms in Table 2 , seem too strong and therefore require further investigation.
VII. Summary
This paper uses a recently created dataset that purports to register every patent case and a substantial fraction of copyright cases filed in US district courts between 2000 and 2008. We found that tort reform causes a large and significant increase in copyright 
